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Abstract: 
 
This paper focuses on residential sorting by social and ethnic status in large French urban 
areas. Our objective is to assess the relative importance of two major determinants of 
segregation stressed by the economic literature (Bartolome and Ross, 2003; Brueckner et al., 
1999): (i) “Alonso sorting over space”, due to the trade-off between land consumption and 
accessibility to the central city and (ii) “Tiebout sorting over jurisdictions”, due to the taste for 
local public goods and by extension for all kinds of local public amenities (e.g. neighborhood 
externalities). Our methodology draws on Schmidheiny (2006). First, a conditional logit 
model is estimated for each urban area, in which moving households are assumed to sort 
based on jurisdiction distance to the central city and jurisdiction mean of households’ incomes 
(as a proxy for the level of public amenities). Second, our estimation results are used to 
simulate the counterfactual residential patterns that would prevail if, alternatively, one or the 
other of these mechanisms were inactive (setting the coefficients of the corresponding 
variables to zero). The contribution of each mechanism to the observed social and ethnic 
segregation is finally appreciated by comparing the values of dissimilarity indexes computed 
on the basis of the counterfactual households distributions and on the observed households 
distribution. “Tiebout-sorting” emerges as the primary cause of social segregation among 
wage-earning households. On the contrary, “Alonso-sorting” appears to be the main driver of 
segregation between economically active and inactive households, as well as between French-
citizen and Foreign-citizen households.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Residential segregation by income and ethnicity is a major feature of contemporary Western 
cities (see e.g. Card et al., 2008; Wheeler, LaJeunesse, 2008) and is generally considered to be 
undesirable. It may be the source of poverty traps due for instance to peer effects in education 
and lack of role models. It may weaken social cohesion and redistribution mechanisms 
(Bjorvatn and Capellen, 2003). In short, segregation may be the source of short-term as well 
as long-term inequalities and social tensions.  
 
In the United States, at least for fifty years, economists have been trying to explain residential 
sorting by income and race in American metropolitan areas. Two main strands of literature are 
competing to this purpose. The local public finance literature and its numerous extensions, 
rooted in Tiebout’s (1956) model of fiscal competition, suggests a “sorting across 
jurisdictions” that indirectly contributes to the understanding of urban configurations. The 
urban economic literature, originally based on the Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth 
(1969) model of a monocentric city, suggests a “sorting over space”. To improve the 
understanding of income sorting, an integrated modelling approach is clearly required 
(Nechyba and Walsh, 2004) and has only been intended recently (Brueckner, Thisse and 
Zenou, 1999; Bartolome and Ross, 2003, 2004, 2007).  
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a contribution to this integated approch on the basis of an 
empirical analysis of residential choices and their impact on urban segregation. Our objective 
is to assess empirically the relative contribution of Tiebout-sorting and Alonso-sorting 
mechanisms to social and ethnic segregation in 37 large French urban areas. Similar to what is 
observed in other industrialized countries, French urban areas, that host in 1999 77% of the 
French population, have been continuously sprawling since the sixties and residential 
segregation by income and ethnicity is commonly acknowledged as a striking issue (Pan Ké 
Shon, 2009; Gobillon and Selod, 2007; Préteceille, 2006). In this context, improving our 
understanding of the causes and consequences of households location decisions within French 
urban areas is obviously of great political relevance, in particular because political answers to 
segregation are not the same whether it is due to Alonso-like or Tiebout-like mechanisms.  
 
This inquiry requires the empirical analysis of residential location choices, in terms of 
distance to the central city and local economic conditions, as a function of households’ 
income. The literature interested in this question mainly relies on housing price hedonic 
estimations aimed at estimating willingness to pay for accessibility and local amenities. 
Nevertheless, some recent works use discrete choice modeling. For instance, Ioannides and 
Zanella (2008) analyze the demand for neighborhood "quality" in contrasting location choices 
of households with and without children. Schmidheiny (2006) focuses on the impact of local 
progressive income taxes on location choices in Switzerland.  
 
We follow the methodology proposed by Schmidheiny (2006). The approach consists in two 
steps. In a first step, we estimate on each of the 37 urban areas a conditional logit model of 
residential location choice, in which households are supposed to select a community 
depending on their income interacted with distance to the central city and mean income of 
potential destinations. The specific advantage associated with relocating close to one’s former 
community is also taken into account through a specific former location dummy. This 
advantage is due to better information about housing supply, lower moving costs, access to 
previously built local social networks, etc. Because considering all the communities of an 
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urban area as potential destinations in the location choice set would give far too many 
alternatives in the logit model, we built a smaller location choice set by grouping jurisdictions 
according to their mean household income and distance to the central city in 1990. As 
households’ incomes are not directly available in our data, occupational status is used as a 
proxy. Ethnicity is also accounted for. Our sample encompasses all migrations that occurred 
between 1990 and 1999 within 37 urban areas of more than 200,000 inhabitants and contains 
210,611 households.  
 
In a second step, social and ethnic dissimilarity indexes of migrants are calculated for each 
urban area either with the observed household distribution or with counterfactual household 
distributions predicted based on the estimated conditional logit model. The relative 
importance of the two “segregation channels” stressed above – i.e. the choice of distance to 
the central city and of neighborhood economic conditions – can be disentangled by predicting 
distributions of households between types using only the coefficients of our model associated 
with either the choice of distance to the central city or the choice of local economic 
conditions. As, according to the third segregation channel in our model, moving households 
are ceteris paribus more likely to choose to relocate nearby their former location rather than 
elsewhere, the segregated pattern prevailing in 1990 is partly translated to 1999.  
 
Our main results are the following. Going beyond the standard urban model to take into 
account income-related amenities is strongly justified by our results: segregation among the 
economically active social groups appears to be mainly driven by the income channel, 
especially for the most affluent social group. Nevertheless, segregation between economically 
active and inactive households is mainly explained by distance, as predicted by the standard 
urban economic model. Regarding ethnic segregation, the distance channel dominates the 
income one, but this is likely to be due to a non-market spatial structure, i.e. the centralization 
of the public housing supply. More important, both of them are dominated by the inertia of 
the previously prevailing segregated pattern.  
 
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the background and the 
hypotheses of our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical model. Section 4 
describes the data, the sample definition and a few descriptive statistics. Results are presented 
in the last section. 
 
 
 
2. Background, theoretical model and overview of the empirical approach 
 
2.1. Background 
 
In the local public finance literature, sorting across jurisdictions is driven by households’ 
tastes for public amenities. In the original Tiebout’s model, public amenities are the level of 
public goods produced by jurisdictions. The level of public good is a normal good, which 
means that its demand increases with income. Households with different income demand 
different public service levels and thus choose different jurisdictions, each household 
choosing the jurisdiction which provides his preferred public service level. Assuming that 
jurisdictions are formed on a featureless plain, jurisdictional boundaries may be freely 
adjusted, the public good is financed by a head-tax and a households’ income does not depend 
on the jurisdiction in which it resides, income stratification across jurisdictions should be 
perfect at the long term equilibrium (Tiebout, 1956). This jurisdictional sorting is a potential 
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source of suburbanization, as people move to suburban jurisdictions to get their desired level 
of public services.  
 
Subsequently, the local public finance framework has been extended to other kinds of public 
amenities, produced by local governments or directly produced by the population, either in 
jurisdictions or in neighborhoods. Some extensions specifically aim at explaining 
suburbanization, income and racial sorting, i.e. the well-known US urban pattern displaying 
rich households in suburbs and poor households in central cities. The implied public amenities 
can be divided into factors that pull rich white households into the suburbs and factors that 
push them out of city centers (Nechyba and Walsh, 2004). From the pull-side, sprawl can be 
explained by the possibility of implementing zoning regulations in suburban jurisdictions to 
exclude those supposed to bring with them negative fiscal externalities (free riding on tax 
payments, etc.) or peer externalities (crime rates, school qualities, etc.). In turn, if zoning 
makes high density impossible in the suburban jurisdictions closer to the city center, this will 
increase the development of sprawl on the city edge. The push-side corresponds to the “flight 
from blight” hypothesis (Jackson, 1985; Mills and Lubuele, 1997): rich households move 
from the central city to suburban jurisdictions in order to flee the negative externalities 
produced by poor households (high crime rates, low school quality, general fiscal distress, 
etc). These push-factors has to be related to Schelling’s (1971) model of segregation, which 
features externalities linked to the neighborhood population composition. This model shows 
that even mild preferences for having similar neighbors may lead to sharp segregation 
patterns. More generally, literature on neighborhood externalities is a particularly vivid field 
of research (Ioannides and Zabel, 2008; Ioannides and Zanella; 2008). It appears that the 
demand for the “quality” of the neighborhood social composition – in terms of providing 
positive externalities for access to employment and human capital accumulation for instance – 
is linked to the local income level and generates income segregation (Benabou, 1993; 
Durlauf, 2004). 
 
In the urban economic literature, sorting over space is driven by households’ tastes for land 
and accessibility to jobs. In the standard monocentric city model, jobs are all in the central 
business district (CBD), so that a location closer to the CBD has the advantage of lower 
commuting costs but – due to land market competition – the inconvenient of higher land 
prices. Both land and accessibility to jobs are normal goods. Rich households have a high 
land consumption and thus are more strongly attracted than the poor by low land prices. 
However, they also have a high opportunity cost of time, so that they value more accessibility 
to jobs than the poor. Sorting between rich and poor households depends on the value of the 
income elasticity of commuting costs relative to the value of the income elasticity of the 
demand for land. If the former is higher than the latter, then the accessibility effect dominates 
and the rich households outbid the poor households for locations closer to the CBD. If, on the 
contrary, the former is lower than the latter, then the land consumption effect dominates and 
the rich households tend to live further to the CDB than the poor households. This case is 
supposed to explain the commonly observed urban pattern in the United States. In both cases, 
the model displays a monotonic relationship between households’ income and distance from 
the CBD (Wheaton, 1977) and produces income segregation.  
 
In addition, a major strength of the monocentric model is that it allows to identify the primary 
causes for urban sprawl in the twentieth century. Firstly, households’ incomes rose 
importantly during this period (Margo, 1992). If the income elasticity of demand for land is 
greater than the income elasticity of commuting costs, as it is traditionally assumed, rising 
income is associated with rising land consumption and thus with decreased density in the 
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urban area. Secondly, transportation costs have dramatically decreased during this period, 
especially due to the development of car ownership (Glaeser and Kahn, 2003). The fall of 
commuting costs generates an additional income effect and above all weakens the centripetal 
force of the model: the amount of land consumed increases and the edge of the city expands. 
 
A model integrating these two strands of the literature must take into account simultaneously 
households’ tastes for public amenities, land consumption and accessibility to jobs. This is the 
case in the model of Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) (BTZ in the following). Income 
sorting is due to the conventional forces of the monocentric city model, but also to the 
households’ tastes for urban amenities. Urban amenities are of three kinds: natural, historical 
and modern. “While natural and historical amenities are largely exogenous, modern 
amenities are endogenous, with their levels depending on the current economic conditions in 
a neighborhood, especially the local income levels. Such amenities might include restaurants, 
theaters, and modern public facilities such as swimming pools and tennis courts.” (Brueckner, 
Thisse and Zenou, 1999, p.94). The authors make the traditional assumption that the 
conventional location forces drive the rich to the suburbs and the poor to the city center (i.e. 
the income elasticity of commuting costs is lower than the income elasticity of land demand). 
They show that if the center’s exogenous amenity advantage is sufficiently large, the 
equilibrium outcome can be reversed: the rich households outbid the poor household for 
locations in the city center. This additional location force could be at the origin of the 
differences between US and European cities. Europe’s longer history and differences in 
government investment in central city infrastructures is likely to explain the differences in the 
spatial pattern of exogenous amenities. In addition, modern endogenous amenities introduce 
the possibility of multiple equilibria: they make the existing location of the rich attractive to 
them wherever it might be. This possibility may help explain the variety of location patterns 
by income observed in reality.  
 
The BTZ model constitutes a first step toward the integration of Tiebout-sorting and Alonso-
sorting models but it unfortunately does not solve their main caveats. As stressed by 
Bartolome and Ross (2003), their predictions are hardly supported by facts: income sorting 
between jurisdictions is far from perfect; empirical estimations suggest that the income 
elasticity of commuting costs is greater than the income elasticity of land demand (Wheaton, 
1977; Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport, 2000); and the relationship between households’ income 
and distance from the CBD does not appear to be monotonic in general (Glaeser, Kahn and 
Rappaport, 2000). Another integrated model that better matches empirical facts was 
developed by Bartolome and Ross (2003, 2004, 2007), hence named the BR model. This is a 
model of a monocentric city with jurisdictions providing public services. Households sort 
over jurisdictions based on conventional location forces and public service levels. The level of 
public services in a jurisdiction is decided by majority voting and rich households must be the 
majority to be able to implement their preferred level of local public goods. When it is not the 
case, they tend to vote with their feet for jurisdictions with high public service levels. Income 
elasticity of commuting costs is now assumed to be greater than the income elasticity of land 
demand, but rich households may nevertheless settle in the suburb because of the higher 
public good level there. Therefore, the model is able to predict complete as well as partial 
income sorting between jurisdictions and across space, and the relationship between 
households’ income and distance from the CBD may be, or not, monotonic, depending on 
households tastes for local public goods and of the unitary commuting time. 
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2.2. Segregation mechanisms in French urban areas 
 
In this article, our objective is to assess empirically the relative contribution of Tiebout-
sorting and Alonso-sorting mechanisms to social and ethnic segregation in 37 large French 
urban areas. Our empirical framework relies upon a few important assumptions. Put in a 
nutshell, we assume that within urban areas, households sort across jurisdictions primarily on 
the basis on jurisdictions’ distances to the central city and jurisdictions’ means of households’ 
incomes. Due to data constraints, we however do not focus on households sorting by income 
but household sorting by “social status”. 
 
More precisely, we first assume that these urban areas are essentially monocentric in terms of 
employment. Considering French urban areas in 1999, we know that central cities contain 
27.2% of the total employed population but 41.5% of total jobs (Julien, 2001). Secondly, as in 
the BTZ and BR models, we assume that households sort between jurisdictions both on the 
basis on their preferred accessibility to the central city (resulting from their tastes for land 
consumption and accessibility to jobs) and their preferred level of public amenities. The 
public amenities supposed here to be relevant regarding households’ location decisions are the 
jurisdiction’s endogenous modern amenities, including notably the public service level and 
the external effects of population composition. Thirdly, we make important assumptions 
about proxies. Modern amenities are assumed to be well proxied by the jurisdictions’ mean of 
households’ incomes: high income jurisdictions offer high quality public and private services, 
positive peer externalities, etc. Accessibility to the central city is assumed to be well proxied 
by the jurisdictions’ bird’s eye distances to the central city.  
 
2.3. Methodology overview 
 
Our methodology draws on Schmidheiny (2006), who studies the impact of local progressive 
income taxes on households’ location choices and income sorting in the city of Basel, 
Switzerland. This methodology is in two steps. The first step consists in the estimation of a 
conditional logit model of households’ location decisions, one for each the 37 urban areas 
considered in our study. For each urban area, we consider a 1/20 sample of households that 
moved within the urban area between 1990 and 1999 (all urban areas together, there are 
210,611 households in our sample). The choice set of each moving household is defined on 
the basis on all jurisdictions included in the urban area in 1999. However, in urban areas of 
more than 200,000 inhabitants, considering all jurisdictions as potential destinations would 
give far too many alternatives for estimating a conditional logit model and hence we group 
jurisdictions of each urban area according to their distances to the central city and to their 
means of households’ incomes in 1990. The choice set finally contains 17 classes of 
jurisdictions. 
 
The main explanatory variables of households’ choices between these classes are interactions 
between households’ characteristics and characteristics of the jurisdiction classes. On one 
hand, we interact either the social or the ethnic status of households with the classes’ 
weighted mean of jurisdictions’ distances to the central city (the weight corresponds to the 
number of houses of each jurisdiction). On the other hand, we interact either the social or the 
ethnic status of households with the location class mean of households’ incomes. Importantly, 
the households’ incomes taken into account are measured in 1990, i.e. before migrations took 
place. Indeed, as stressed by the BZT model, modern amenities are endogenous: they are both 
a cause and consequence of the location patterns of different income groups. There is a 
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simultaneity issue that we try to limit in our econometric model by taking the past value of 
location income.  
 
The second step relies on predicted location choices and segregation measures. For each 
urban area, we can easily measure the observed level of segregation by social and ethnic 
status across classes of jurisdictions of moving households, based on the computation of 
dissimilarity indexes. Then, for each urban area, we can use the coefficients obtained in our 
first step estimation to predict the counterfactual location pattern of these households and 
measure the predicted level of segregation by social and ethnic status across classes. By 
comparing the observed and predicted segregation levels, we are able to assess the prediction 
power of our model, thus the joint explanatory power of Tiebout-sorting and Alonso-sorting 
mechanisms. Furthermore, the relative importance of these two “segregation channels” can be 
disentangled. Indeed, for each urban area, we can select the coefficients associated with 
explanatory variables corresponding to one segregation channels only (interactions with 
classes’ distances only or with classes’ mean incomes only), setting all the other coefficients 
to zero, and predict the corresponding counterfactual location patterns of households across 
classes. We can thus measure and compare the “Tiebout-sorting”  predicted level of 
segregation and the “Alonso-sorting”  predicted level of segregation. A third “segregation 
channel” is also included in our model, namely, the specific advantages of relocating nearby 
one’s former location. These advantages may be due to better information about housing 
supply, lower moving costs, access to previously built local social networks, etc. We expect 
that moving households are more likely to choose to relocate nearby their former location 
rather than elsewhere, and that the segregated pattern prevailing in 1990 is partly translated to 
1999 due to this additional effect.  
 
 
 
3. Data and sample definition 
 
Before to expose the econometric model in detail in section 5, we present in this section our 
data and the variables used in the estimations. We also give a few descriptive statistics 
concerning the location classes that constitute the explained variable of our model, as well as 
the sample statistics.  
 
3.1. Data 
 
Our empirical investigation is essentially based on the 1999 French Population Census 
(produced by INSEE, the French National Institute for Statistics and Economic Study). A 
1/20th sample is drawn from the Census, in which detailed characteristics of households and 
their members are available. Residential location of these households at the Commune level is 
known in 1999 and 1990, allowing to trace households' moves. Unfortunately, households’ 
incomes are not. We will therefore make use of the occupational status of the household's 
reference person as a proxy for household's income. We will however give statistics in the 
following in order to show that using occupational status categories is indeed useful to 
measure income segregation.  
 
As to location characteristics, our analysis requires information on jurisdiction average 
household income as well as jurisdiction's distances to the employment center of the urban 
area. The mean households’ incomes of each Commune (i.e. French jurisdiction) comes from 
the French Tax Authorities (INSEE/DGI). The French National Geographic Institute (IGN) 
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provides the geographic coordinates of each Commune’s town hall, allowing to compute the 
straight-line distance between the Commune's townhall and the center of the urban area. Other 
characteristics of locations are taken from the 1999 Population Census aggregated at the 
Commune level.  
 
In the descriptive statistics, we also make use of 1993 local housing tax rates provided by the 
French Authority for Local Governments (INSEE/DGCL). We also own data from the French 
and the Parisian notary societies (PERVAL, Chambre des notaires de Paris) giving mean 
housing prices in 2002.  
 
3.2. Choice of urban areas and definition of the location choice set 
 
Our study is aimed at explaining location choices within urban areas, that is, in labor-market 
areas within which households are assumed to choose their residential location considering 
their workplace as given. Urban areas are defined in France based on commuting flows as 
measured in 1999 from Census data. An urban area comprises a city center and inner suburbs 
divided into several jurisdictions and a ring of outer suburbs composed of jurisdictions that do 
not belong to the urban agglomeration but which are tightly tied to it by commuting flows.1 
There were 354 urban areas in France in 1999 with a total of 45 millions inhabitants 
representing 77% of the French population. Because sorting is a more striking issue the bigger 
the urban area, we focus on urban areas of more than 200,000 inhabitants in 1999.  
 
Within each urban area, considering each jurisdiction separately as a potential destination 
would give far too many alternatives in the location choice model.2 Consequently, within each 
urban area, we form groups of jurisdictions that will be considered as alternatives in the 
choice model. These groups are aimed at being as homogenous as possible with respect to the 
two main characteristics of our analysis: distance to the city center and household mean 
income. Therefore, in each urban area, we classify jurisdictions: (i) first of all, according to 
their position in the urban area: city center, inner suburbs, outer suburbs; (ii) then, in each of 
these preliminary groups - -except for the city center that has only one jurisdiction-, according 
to their position relatively to the group median distance to the city center: close and distant 
jurisdictions; (iii) and eventually, according to quartiles of the jurisdictions’ average 
household income. Therefore, we obtain 17 groups of jurisdictions that are considered by 
moving households as potential destinations. 
 
Note that this classification imposes to have at least eight communes in the inner suburbs and 
eight in the outer suburbs to be able to define a choice set of 17 types. Applying this criteria to 
urban areas of more than 200,000 inhabitants yields 37 urban areas (out of 41 French urban 
areas of this size).3 
 
We now describe the 17 types of location thus defined. In particular, we want to stress the 
correlation between the types’ average household income and other characteristics, namely: 
the percentage of foreign population and local taxes. For the sake of clarity, we present the 
descriptive statistics after making an additional pooling of jurisdictions: at the last step of the 
                                                 
1 In France, an urban unit (unité urbaine in French), is a set of communities, the territory of which is covered by 
a built-up area of more than 2,000 inhabitants, and in which buildings are separated by no more than 200 meters. 
Each urban area is built around an urban unit having at least 5 000 jobs. 
2 For instance, Lyon urban area has as many as 296 communities. Toulouse urban area encompasses 
342 communities.  
3 The excluded urban areas are those of Brest, Reims, Limoges and Nîmes. 
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classification, we group the jurisdictions which belong to the second and third quartiles of 
average household income. Thus, we present statistics only for 13 types in Table 1. As urban 
areas can have different average household income and different spatial ranges, several 
statistics in Table 1 are given relatively to the urban area average characteristics.  
 
 
Table 1: Characteristics of the 17 location classes relatively to the urban area average 
 
  Central jurisdiction 
 income a 
 distance b 
City center % foreign 
 housing tax rate b  
 housing prices 
93.2 
0 
8.0 
18.20 
102.3 
  Low-income 
jurisdictions 
Medium-income 
jurisdictions 
High-income 
jurisdictions 
income a 84.4 104.3 139.1 
distance a  42.2 41.7 42.8 
% foreign b 7.5 4.1 3.0 
housing tax rate b  14.16 12.95 10.84 
 
Close 
inner  
suburbs 
housing prices a 90.0 107.8 124.5 
income a 85.0 101.9 129.8 
distance a  97.6 94.9 84.8 
% foreign b 6.6 4.4 3.2 
housing tax rate b  13.16 12.16 9.98 
 
Distant 
Inner  
suburbs 
housing prices a 90.3 105.6 122.6 
income a 82.0 99.4 127.4 
distance  a 124.2 110.2 92.8 
% foreign b 3.2 2.4 2.2 
housing tax rate b  10.49 9.88 9.70 
 
Close  
Outer 
Suburbs 
housing prices a 85.8 101.3 113.8 
income a 69.1 83.0 101.3 
distance a  204.5 184.3 179.9 
% foreign b 2.5 2.4 2.6 
housing tax rate b  9.03 9.51 9.26 
 
Distant 
outer  
suburbs 
housing prices a 74.2 84.0 97.7 
a These figures read as follows: on average over the 37 urban areas of our sample, the mean of households’ 
incomes in the close inner suburbs of an urban area equals 84.4% of the average value of the same statistic 
computed over all types of the same urban area. 
b These are to be read more directly:  on average over the 37 urban areas of our sample, 7.5% of all households 
are headed by a foreign person in close inner suburbs and the housing tax rate equals 14.16%. 
 
Broadly speaking, except in the close inner suburbs, high-income jurisdictions appear to be 
closer to the city center than medium-income jurisdictions, which in turn are closer than low-
income jurisdictions. Within distant inner-suburbs for instance, low-income jurisdictions are 
at 0.98 from the average distance, medium-income jurisdictions at 0.95 and high-income 
jurisdictions at 0.85. Housing prices are decreasing with distance from the city center and 
increasing with the jurisdiction’s average household income, ranging from 74% of the urban 
area mean in low-income jurisdictions of distant outer suburbs to 124% in high-income 
jurisdictions of close inner suburbs. The proportion of foreign citizen decreases with distance 
and with the jurisdiction’s average household income. Housing tax rates follow the same 
pattern, with higher tax rates for lower income jurisdictions. Note that prices used in these 
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statistics are those of 2002, so that we cannot use them in the estimations due to simultaneity 
biases. Tax rates are given in 1993 and the percentage of foreign citizen in 1990, but both 
create multicollinearity issues when included simultaneously with distances and mean 
incomes of types. 
 
3.3. Sample definition and descriptive statistics 
 
Following Schmidheiny (2006), we focus on the behavior of households that moved within an 
urban area, ignoring immobile households and other moving households. Indeed, we suppose 
that local migrations (i.e. within an urban area) are mainly driven by motivations related to 
housing (broadly understood as including access to employment and amenities), whereas long 
distant migrations are essentially linked with the search of study and employment 
opportunities, that may be associated with different location behaviors. Furthermore, people 
newly arrived in an urban area may not know well the characteristics of locations available in 
this urban area. Defined on these criteria, the total estimation sample (summing the 37 urban 
areas) contains 210,611 households that moved between 1990 and 1999 within urban areas. 
Some commentaries and simple statistics are given to justify our choices and present the 
sample. 
 
Considering the 37 urban areas of our study, 51.5% of households moved between 1990 and 
1999. Among the movers, 67.7% were living in the same urban area in 1990. Descriptive 
statistics seem to corroborate the idea that short distance moves are mainly driven by 
residential considerations whereas moves to a new urban area are employment or study 
related. Indeed, households that moved, but not within an urban area, have five times more 
often a student as reference person of the household (and logically display a lower mean age 
and mean size) (see Table 2). The reference person is also more often a foreign citizen, what 
may be partly due to the arrival of new immigrants looking for economic opportunities in 
French urban areas between 1990 and 1999.  
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of the population and of mobile households 
 
 
Household 
with student 
as RP1 (%) 
Househ. with 
foreign citizen 
as RP (%) 
Mean age of 
the RP 
Mean 
household size  
Household in 
a new location 
class in 1999 
(%) 
Whole 
population 5.33 7.83 50 2.39  
Migrants within 
urban areas 4.03 8.39 42 2.55 45.79 
Others 
migrants 20.23 10.21 36 2.15 73.65
2 
1 RP: Reference Person 
2 Calculated for households that were living in another urban area of our selection in 1990. 
 
 
We define three “ethnic groups” and six “social groups” based on the characteristics of the 
reference person of the household.4 The former are foreign citizens, French citizens born 
                                                 
4 The reference person of the household is always the man in households where a man and a woman are in 
couple and either a man or a woman in all other cases. 
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abroad and French citizens born in France. The latter are built on the basis of occupational 
status as follows: (i) executives and high intellectual professions; (ii) white-collars in mid 
management positions; (iii) white-collar subordinates; (iv) blue-collar workers; 
(v) independent workers; (vi) economically inactive people, i.e. retirees and people who never 
worked. The sizes of these groups are given in Table 3. As we would like to be able to 
interpret the spatial segregation of these groups in terms of income segregation, Table 3 also 
displays the results of a simple linear regression aimed at predicting the average income of 
each category. This regression is performed on data taken from the French Housing Survey 
1996 (see Appendix 1). Table 3 shows that the classification into these four groups translates 
in a hierarchy in terms of mean annual income by consumption unit. Therefore, measuring 
segregation on the basis of groups (i) to (iv) provides us information about income 
segregation. On the contrary, we know that in groups (v) and (vi), incomes and professional 
situations are much dispersed (for instance, independent workers can be farmers, craftsmen or 
big entrepreneurs). 
 
 
Table 3: Sample distribution by occupational status and nationality of the reference 
person and estimated mean annual income by consumption unit (in French Francs) 
 
 French Foreign nationality All 
 N1 Mean2 N Mean N Mean 
Executives 31,046 152,527 1,041 127,639 32,087 151,720 
Intermediate professions 40,779 102,776 1,687 81,454 42,466 101,929 
White-collar workers 34,673 73,546 2,613 57,042 37,286 72,390 
Blue-collar workers 40,616 69,768 7,621 56,116 48,237 67,611 
All 147,114 97,273 12,962 65,345 160,076 94,688 
1 The number of observations corresponds to the estimation sample.  
2 The mean income is estimated based on French Housing Survey data. 
 
 
 
4. Empirical model of location choice and measure of residential segregation  
 
4.1.  A conditional logit model of location choice 
 
We consider a random utility model, according to which utility of a household i in a location j 
is the sum of a deterministic and a random part:  
 
 ijijij VV ε+=*  (1) 
where Vij is the deterministic part representing the influence of observed household and 
jurisdiction characteristics and ij is the idiosyncratic random term specific to household i and 
jurisdiction j.  
 
In order to test our hypotheses, utility is supposed to take the following form: 
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where ln(yj) is the average population income in location j, dj distance between location j and 
the city center, Oi and Ei are two vectors of dummy variables relating respectively to the 
occupational status and ethnic category of the household, Si represents its size and Fij is a 
dummy variable indicating whether location i was the former location of the household. αj, β1 
to β3 ,  γ11 to γ32 and δ are vectors of coefficients to be estimated.  
 
By doing so, we suppose that households differ in terms of locational choices based on their 
income, ethnic origin and size. We also assume that they make their choice based on average 
income in the jurisdiction and size to the center. All the choice determinants that do not differ 
with household are in the location classes fixed effects αj. In other words, the impact of the 
location characteristics that are constant across households are left in the location dummy, 
together with unobserved variables.  
 
A household chooses among potential locations by comparing its utility level in the different 
location types and select location j which maximizes his utility:  
 ),...,1(
** KCkVV ikij =∈∀≥  (3) 
where C is the choice set of K alternative locations.  
 
We assume that the error terms are identically and independently distributed following an 
extreme value distribution, of which cumulative distribution function is given by: 
 
 
 (4) 
 
As a result, the probability for a household i to choose location j is:  
  (5) 
This conditional logit model is estimated by the maximum likelihood method. 
 
Our empirical model then focuses on interaction variables between the location characteristics 
and household's characteristics. As stated in the theoretical model, we expect that households 
sort by income relatively to the distance to the central city. We introduce interactions between 
dummies for household's social categories (white-collars in mid management positions being 
the reference) and location distance to the city center (and this variable squared). The same is 
done with a dummy for household's ethnicity (French born in France being the reference). To 
control for household's size, we also introduce an interaction between household size and type 
distance to the center (and this variable squared). We also expect that migrants take account 
of social context and related endogenous amenities. The same interaction variables are built 
with the location mean income instead of distance to the central city. 
 
To sum up, household variables interacted with location variables are the following:  
- dummies for the reference person occupational status, 
- dummy for the reference person not being a French citizen, 
- dummy for the reference person being a French citizen born abroad, 
- number of persons living in the household. 
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Location variables are: 
- mean fiscal income in 19905 divided by its average over the 17 types, 
- distance to the central city in km6 less the mean distance to the city center over the 17 types 
in the urban area, so as to avoid colinearity with their squared counterparts. 
- distance less mean distance squared. 
 
A variable is both a household and location variable: 
- dummy for the location being the former location of the household. 
 
4.2. Choice probabilities and measures of social and ethnic segregation 
 
Our aim is not only to test for the different conjectured factors of location choices, but also to 
assess the importance of each of them in segregation levels observed in French urban areas. 
We can do so by comparing segregation levels in different counterfactual cities that are 
predicted by the model estimated coefficients.  
 
Segregation levels are classically measured by different spatial concentration indexes. Among 
them, the dissimilarity index is the most commonly used. Based on socio-occupational 
categories and ethnic origins that we use in the location model, we compute multi-group 
dissimilarity indexes (Readon and Firebaugh, 2002) of which the general expression is the 
following: 
 
  
= =
−=
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j
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12
1
ππ  (6) 
 
where m indexes the different groups of population and j the different locations. πm is the 
proportion of group m in the population, wj is the weight of location j in the total population 
and πjm is the share in group m for the population in location j. I is equal to )1(
1
m
M
m
m ππ
=
−  and 
measures the diversity of groups among the population. 
 
Estimation of the conditional logit model in a given urban area provides for each household 
its probabilities to choose each available location alternatives. Of course we also know the 
true distribution of moving households among locations. Hence, we can compute measures of 
segregation in both cases and compare observed and predicted patterns, so as to assess how 
well our estimated model accounts for the observed residential segregation.  
 
Then, using only the coefficients attached to one dimension of location choice (e.g. distance 
to the central city) and setting all other coefficients except fixed effects to zero, a new set of 
choice probabilities can be predicted. Measuring segregation with the resulting counterfactual 
household distribution provides information as to the contribution of this causal channel to the 
production of segregation.  
 
More specifically, we will compute three types of predicted location choice probability.  
The general form of this probability is:  
                                                 
5 For each type, we sum the total fiscal income of communities belonging to the type and divide by the total 
number of households of these communities. 
6 For each type, this distance is the average over all communities belonging to the type of the community level 
distances to the city center, weighted by the number of housing offered by each community. 
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  (7) 
where Vij takes different forms as follows: 
 
(i) Probabilities predicted by the full model  
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This is simply the prediction of the full model and allows us to assess the explanatory power 
of the location model. 
 
(ii) Probabilities predicted by a given segregation channel 
 
Our conditional logit model includes only three locational characteristics: household mean 
income, distance to the central city and, for each household, if it is her former location. The 
first two location characteristics are interacted with household characteristics, allowing 
location behaviors to differ along the line of the latter. The third is per se both a location and a 
household characteristic. Taking our estimation results and setting all the coefficients 
corresponding to these variables to zero, except those associated with one of these segregation 
channels provides us the choice probabilities that would be relevant if only this channel 
produced social and ethnic segregation or in other words if households considered only this 
determinant in their location choice. Computing the corresponding dissimilarity indexes, we 
can assess the relative contribution to segregation of each of these channels. 
 
For instance, the predicted probability based on the distance segregation channel would be: 
 
 ijijijijijijjij SdSdEdEdOdOdV 232312222121211
~
γγγγγγα ++++++=  (9) 
 
We refer in particular to the inertia model, which gives the following predicted probabilities: 
 
 ijjij FV δα +=
~  (10) 
 
(iii) Probabilities predicted by behaviors differing with occupational or ethnic group 
 
In our conditional logit model, households differ by their belonging to a social group, their 
ethnic status, their size and their former urban location. Let us focus on social and ethnic 
status. Taking our estimation results and setting the coefficients of all interactions implying 
ethnic status (resp. social status) to zero provide the choice probabilities that would be 
relevant if behaviors did not differ between ethnic groups (resp. social groups) and was the 
same as the behavior of the reference category in the econometric model. Thereby, computing 
the corresponding dissimilarity indexes, we can check if social segregation is mainly 
explained by the differing behaviors of households belonging to differing social groups or by 
the combination of the differing behaviors of households belonging to different ethnic groups 
and the social composition of ethnic groups. In the same manner, we can check if ethnic 
segregation is mainly explained by the differing behaviors of households belonging to 
 15 
differing ethnic groups or by the combination of the differing behaviors of households 
belonging to different social groups and the ethnic composition of social groups. 
  
The corresponding predicted probabilities are for instance, considering that households only 
differ in terms of social categories:  
 
 ijijijjij OdOdOyV 212111 )ln(
~
γγβα +++=  (8) 
 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Estimation results. 
 
The estimated coefficients for the five largest urban areas, namely Paris, Lyon, Marseille, 
Lille and Toulouse, are presented in Table 4 as examples. Joint significativity tests aimed at 
assessing the significance of each of the interactions in the model are presented for the 37 
urban areas in table 5. The signs of estimated significant coefficients are presented in Table 6. 
First of all, fixed effects are always jointly significant (Table 5). Estimated fixed effects for 
the 17 location classes are all negative: the central city is always more attractive, what 
obviously reflects differences in housing stocks, which are also differences in housing 
opportunities. More densely populated locations mechanically receive more migrants. As 
expected, it is also observed that outer suburbs – which exhibit a very low density compared 
to others – generally display the lowest coefficients. These fixed effects thus control, among 
other effects, for the size differences between locations. 
 
We comment only briefly the coefficients corresponding to the effect of household size and 
previous location. Household size significantly influence distance choice in the vast majority 
of the urban areas. The effect is the one predicted by urban economic models: large 
households locate further away from the city center, although the effect is not linear, as shown 
by the coefficient of quadratic distance. The interaction between household size and average 
location income is significant and positive in 13 urban areas, which can be interpreted in 
particular as the fact that the presence of children increases the preference for wealthy 
locations. Finally, there is a very significant effect of previous location on location choices: 
locations where the household was initially are very more likely to be chosen as the new 
destination when moving. 
 
The interactions of social category dummies with location average income are jointly 
significant in 29 out of 37 urban areas. This result points out the power of the search for 
income-related amenities in the production of residential social segregation. When significant, 
the coefficient of the "executive" category is positive, whereas it is always negative for white-
collar subordinates and blue-collars (Table 6). This is true in particular for the five urban 
areas in Table 4. As expected, the most affluent social groups are more attracted by the most 
affluent locations than the less favored social groups. However, in most urban areas, the 
coefficient of the interaction with location income is higher for blue-collar than for white-
collar subordinates: although the income differential between these two categories is very 
small (see Table 3 in Section 3.3), they behave somewhat differently regarding income-
related amenities.  
 
The effect of social status on the choice of distance is slightly less often significant. 
Nevertheless, these interactions are jointly significant in 27 out of 37 urban areas (Table 5). 
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On average, white-collar subordinates have the most negative coefficients: they are the least 
attracted by distant locations, compared to intermediate categories (Table 6). Apart from 
Paris, it is the case in the large urban areas considered in Table 4. In Paris urban area, the 
executives are the category that is the most reluctant to settle in distant locations, ceteris 
paribus. This can be explained by the level of traffic congestion, that makes wealthy 
households locate close to the center. Blue-collar workers behave differently from white-
collar subordinates: they behave either like the intermediate category (reference) or are more 
attracted by distant locations (in only three urban areas, among which Paris). This result is in 
line with what we already know from urban configurations in France: it has been observed 
that blue-collar workers are more prone to locate in outer suburbs than white-collars 
(Goffette-Nagot, 2000). What we show here is that it remains true after controlling for 
preferences regarding income-related amenities.  
 
The effect of ethnic origin, after controlling for social status, is slightly weaker than that of 
occupational status. Still, the coefficients of the interactions between ethnic origin and 
distance from the central city are significant and negative in the majority of the urban areas 
(21 urban areas). This centralization of foreigners could be the consequence of a strong 
concentration of public housing in the inner suburbs and the fact that foreign households are 
often housed in public housing. Further, only in half of the urban areas (18) do foreign 
citizens behave differently than French citizen born in France regarding location income, by 
locating in less affluent municipalities. French citizens born abroad behave more often as their 
fellow-citizens, except in the four biggest urban areas (Paris, Lyon, Marseille and Lille) and 
in three others of medium size. This result also can be the consequence of public housing 
accommodation, as the average income in the municipality is likely to be correlated with the 
percentage of public housing in the housing stock. The significantly different behavior of 
foreign households can also be the consequence of network effects, as immigrants often 
choose to settle near individual belonging to the same ethnic group.  
 
5.2. Analysis of social and ethnic segregation. 
 
In the three following sections, we present and analyze simple statistics for the dissimilarity 
indexes computed for each of the 37 urban areas. In the first section, we look at how well our 
full model can predict the observed socially and ethnically segregated patterns. Based on 
predictions obtained with partial models, we then try to assess the relative contributions to 
segregation of the choices of “neighborhood income” and “distance to the central city”. 
Lastly, we try to disentangle the social and ethnic determinants of the observed segregated 
pattern. 
 
5.2.1. Observed segregation patterns and predictions of the full model 
 
Table 7 and 8 present the observed and predicted dissimilarity indexes for the five largest 
urban areas taken as examples, for income and ethnic segregation respectively. The following 
tables display indexes averaged over the 37 urban areas: observed indexes in Table 9 and the 
ratio of predicted to observed indexes in Table 10. 
 
Broadly speaking, we can first note that the mean values of the dissimilarity indexes 
computed here at a supra-municipality geographic level are low compared to what is generally 
obtained in studies working with municipality or infra-municipality levels. This is expected as 
social and ethnic segregation is likely to be stronger the smaller the spatial scale considered. 
Note also that individuals considered here are migrants and it is not clear a priori whether 
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their spatial segregation is likely to be stronger or weaker than the segregation level of the 
whole population.  
 
The household charateristics considered in the estimated model allows to consider separately 
households of which the reference person is out of labor force and those of which the 
reference person is in labor force. Among the latter, five categories are considered: 
executives, intermediate professions, white-collars, blue-collars and independent workers. We 
first discuss segregation between these five categories and then oppose them to the category 
of inactive individuals. We base our discussion on indexes averaged over the 37 urban areas. 
 
The mean value of the multi-group dissimilarity index corresponding to the observed spatial 
distribution of categories in labor force is equal to 0.14, considering either four or five social 
groups (Table 9).7 Regarding binary oppositions between the four income-ordered social 
categories, we observe that the highest index is obtained for the opposition between 
executives and blue-collars (0.25) and the second highest for the one between executives and 
white-collar subordinates (0.19). A lower value is obtained for the opposition between 
executives and white-collars in mid-management positions (0.15). A value of 0.14 is then 
obtained for all other oppositions implying the latter. Thereby, social segregation seems to 
obey to income hierarchy between social groups: the higher the income differential, the 
higher the value of the dissimilarity index. However, less expected in this respect is the strong 
segregation between white-collar subordinates and blue-collars (0.18), two categories that 
display a nearly equal mean income level. Finally, the mean dissimilarity index increases to 
0.16 when the category of economically inactive households is added to the five-group index. 
This result may be surprising given the low value of the dissimilarity index corresponding to 
the binary opposition between economically active and inactive households (0.13).  
 
Regarding now ethnic segregation, the mean value of the multi-group dissimilarity index 
opposing foreign citizen, French citizen born abroad and French citizen born in France is 
0.18. As expected, the highest value of binary indexes opposing these groups is obtained for 
the opposition between foreign citizen and French citizen born in France (0.24). More 
interesting is the higher value of the index corresponding to the opposition between French 
born abroad and foreign citizen (0.19) than that between French born abroad and French born 
in France (0.15). “Spatial integration” among French citizens is far from perfect but seems to 
be at work. 
 
Yet, the question we are interested in is the following: to what extent is our parsimonious 
location choice model able to predict this observed segregation pattern? Recall that our model 
includes only three location characteristics: location mean income, location distance to the 
central city and, for each household, if it is its former location. Thereby, this model features 
only three “segregation channels”: differing choices of “income” and “distance” between 
households of differing characteristics, as well as the inertia of the previously prevailing 
segregated pattern due to the advantages associated with relocating nearby one’s former 
location (better information about housing supply, lower moving costs, access to previously 
built social networks, etc.). Knowing the predictive power of our full model provides 
information on the importance of these factors in the formation of social and ethnic 
segregation. To support this point, dissimilarity indexes are now computed considering the 
distribution of households corresponding to the choice probabilities predicted by our 
                                                 
7 The four group index opposes the four categories that can be meaningfully ordered by mean income by 
consumption unit, i.e. executives, white-collars in mid-management positions, white-collar subordinates and 
blue-collars (see section 3.3). Independent workers are added to build the five group index. 
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conditional logit estimation results (see equation 8 section 4.2). For each of these indexes, we 
comment the average value of the predicted index relatively to the observed index.  
 
The model predicts, on average over the 37 urban areas, 72% of the value of the observed 
multi-group dissimilarity indexes built with economically active households (either with four 
or five groups) and 80% of the value of the multi-group index built with both active and 
inactive households (Table 9). It predicts on average 71% of the value of the observed binary 
index opposing active to inactive households, and from 65% to 76% of the values of the ones 
opposing occupational categories. Regarding ethnic segregation, the model predicts on 
average 64% of the value of the observed ethnic multi-group dissimilarity index. It predicts 
68% of the value of the observed binary index opposing foreign citizen to French citizen born 
in France, 73% of the one opposing foreign citizen to French citizen born abroad and 54% of 
the one opposing French citizen born in France to French citizen born abroad.  
 
This set of results shows that the estimated model reproduces quite well the observed 
segregation patterns. Even in the urban areas where it is the less explanatory, it still predicts 
more than 30% of the observed social segregation level. This indicates clearly that the three 
segregation channels included in our model indeed contribute strongly to the formation of 
social and ethnic segregation.  
 
5.2.2. “Income driven” vs. “Distance driven” ethnic and social segregation. 
 
As explained in details in section 4.2, it is possible, by computing predicted location choices 
considering only one characteristics of location (income, distance or being the former 
household's location), to assess how strong the segregation would be if households considered 
only this characteristic when choosing their location. By doing so, we can determine whether 
the observed social segregation is mainly explained by the Alonso model or by income-
related amenities.  
 
Table 11 shows that the proportion of the value of the observed five-group dissimilarity index 
explained by the “income” channel partial model is 40% vs. 37% for the “distance” channel 
partial model and 32% for the “inertia” channel partial model.8 Segregation among the 
economically active social groups thus appears to be mainly driven by choices of location 
average income, but choices of distance to the central city and the location inertia also 
contribute significantly.  
 
Adding the economically inactive population in the analysis reverses this conclusion: 
segregation between social groups is now mainly (but only slightly) driven by distance, the 
“income” model explaining 56% vs. 58% for the “distance” model and 52% for the “inertia” 
model. Looking at binary oppositions allows to refine the analysis. Segregation between 
economically active and inactive households is clearly driven by the “distance” channel: the 
“income” model explains only 29% vs. 57% for the “distance” model and 25% for the 
“inertia” model. As predicted by the standard urban economic model, estimation results for 
most of the urban areas show that inactive households settle significantly further away from 
the central city.  
 
Regarding economically active households, on the one hand, all the oppositions implying 
executives show a much stronger contribution to segregation of the “income” channel 
                                                 
8 The same proportions are respectively 42%, 36% and 32% for the four-group index. 
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compared to the “distance” channel. The proportion of the value of the observed index 
opposing executives to blue-collars explained by the “income” model is 51% vs. only 16% for 
the “distance” model (and 32% for the “inertia” model). The same proportions are 
respectively 45% vs. 21% (and 46%) for the opposition between executives and white-collars 
in mid-management positions and 59% vs. 50% (and 38%) for the opposition between 
executives and white-collar subordinates. Executives presumably settle in affluent 
neighborhoods hardly accessible for others groups. Amenity considerations seem more 
important than the standard urban economic trade-off between proximity to the central 
business district and land consumption to explain the segregation between this group and 
poorer households.  
 
The same prevails for the opposition between white-collars in mid management positions and 
blue-collars (proportions are respectively 42%, 19% and 35%). On the other hand, the 
“distance” channel is clearly dominant in the explanation of the segregation between white-
collars in mid management positions and white-collar subordinates (35% for the “income” 
model vs. 54% for the “distance” model and 24% for the “inertia” model), and it is even more 
the case regarding the segregation between the latter and blue-collars (23% vs. 55% and 
27%). The specific behavior of white-collar subordinates with respect to the choice of 
distance to the central city is at the source of the surprisingly strong segregation level 
observed between this group and blue-collars and the surprisingly low segregation level 
observed between this group and executives already stressed in section 5.2.1. Estimation 
results show that in most of the urban areas, white-collar subordinates – although displaying 
a similar income compared to blue-collars – do not follow them in their migration toward 
peripheral urban locations. They tend to settle in central locations, so that they do not 
segregate too much from the more economically favored groups (white-collars in mid 
management positions and executives), although they choose more central locations than the 
former and less affluent locations than the latter. This point would be worth further 
investigations. 
 
Regarding ethnic segregation, the proportion of the value of the observed multi-group 
dissimilarity index explained by the “income” model is 24% vs. 35% for the “distance” model 
and 43% for the “inertia” model (Table 12). Ethnic groups were segregated in 1990 and as 
moving households preferentially chose to relocate close to their initial location, they are still 
segregated in 1999: this segregation inertia appears to be the first segregation force. One 
reason may be that foreign citizens are less able to get information about housing supply in 
other parts of the urban area and less able to support large moving costs. Another reason may 
be that they are more dependent on local social networks, for instance due to their larger 
participation to informal economic activities.  
 
Differing choices of distance to the central city between ethnic groups is the second 
segregation force. This could be explained by the over-representation of foreign citizen and 
French citizen born abroad in social housing and the historical clustering of social housing in 
close inner suburbs. Binary oppositions provide additional insights. Segregation between 
foreign citizens and French citizens born in France is also mainly driven by the “distance” 
channel, but the “income” channel appear more important than in the multi-group case: the 
“income” model explains 32% vs. 39% for the “distance” model and 41% for the “inertia” 
model. Regarding segregation between foreign citizens and French citizens born abroad, the 
“distance” channel is more important than both the “income” and the “inertia” channels (37% 
vs. 52% and 39%). This may be explained by the exit of social housing and consecutive 
decentralization of a large number of French citizens born abroad being former foreign 
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citizens having simultaneously acquired the French nationality and improved their economic 
conditions of living. Eventually, regarding segregation between French citizens born abroad 
and French citizens born in France, the “income” channel is still dominated by the “distance” 
channel, but most of all, the “inertia” channel strongly dominates both other channels (11% 
vs. 29% and 44%). Again, we can think that a large number of French citizens born abroad 
are former foreign citizens having acquired the nationality and improved their conditions of 
living: they were thus likely to be strongly segregated from French citizen born in France in 
1990. Now, although their behaviors regarding location characteristics came closer to the 
behaviors of French citizens born in France, the former level of segregation is partly 
reproduced due to the advantages procured by the relocation nearby one’s former location. 
However, the thrust of this last comment is limited by the relatively poor performance of our 
model in explaining this binary index (only 54% of the observed index is explained by the full 
model, which is the lowest explanation power displayed in our study).  
 
5.2.3. Ethnic vs. social determinants of ethnic and social segregation. 
 
As explained in details in section 4.2, it is possible, by computing predicted location choices 
considering only occupational status (respectively origin), to assess how strong the 
segregation would be if households located in the same way, irrespective of their origin 
(respectively occupational status). By doing so, we can determine whether the observed social 
segregation is mainly explained by differences in location behaviors according to 
occupational status or by the differences in behaviors of ethnic groups and the social 
composition of these groups.  
 
Results are unambiguous. The proportion of the value of the observed multi-group 
dissimilarity indexes built with economically active households (indexes with four or five 
groups) explained by the partial model that does not account for ethnic status is 73% versus 
32% for the one that does not account for social status (Table 11). The same proportions are 
respectively 80% versus 51% regarding the multi-group index including inactive households 
(six groups index). Finially, the same differences are observed when considering the binary 
indexes opposing social groups. These results show that both social status and ethnicity 
contribute to the production of social segregation, differing behaviors between social groups 
being however clearly the main determinant of social segregation.  
 
Regarding ethnic segregation, the proportion of the value of the observed ethnic multi-group 
dissimilarity index explained by the partial model that do not account for ethnic status is 38% 
vs. 64% for the one that do not account for social status (Table 12). The same proportions are 
respectively 38% vs. 66% regarding the binary index opposing foreign citizen to French 
citizen born in France, 48% vs. 59% regarding the one opposing foreign citizen to French 
citizen born abroad, and 38% vs. 57% regarding the one opposing French citizen born in 
France to French citizen born abroad. These results show that both social status and ethnicity 
contribute to the production of ethnic segregation, differing behaviors between ethnic groups 
being clearly the main determinant of ethnic segregation.  
 
As could be expected, household social characteristics appear more important to predict 
ethnic segregation than household ethnic characteristics to explain social segregation. In other 
words, social segregation is not explained by a social composition effect of ethnic groups and 
conversely, ethnic segregation is not the result of the ethnic composition of social groups.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides a framework aimed at analyzing the determinants of location choices and 
social and ethnic segregation within urban areas. Our objective is to assess empirically the 
relative contribution of Tiebout-sorting and Alonso-sorting mechanisms to social and ethnic 
segregation in 37 large French urban areas. We propose a conditional logit model of urban 
location choic in which moving households are assumed to sort based on jurisdiction distance 
to the central city and jurisdiction average household income (as a proxy for the level of 
public amenities). Estimation of this model provides for each household her probabilities to 
choose each one the available location alternatives and allow the comparison of various 
predicted segregation patterns with the observed segregation pattern.  
 
Our main results are the following. Going beyond the standard urban model to take into 
account income-related amenities is strongly justified by our results: segregation among 
economically active social groups appears to be mainly driven by the income channel, 
especially for the most affluent social group. Nevertheless, segregation between economically 
active and inactive households is mainly explained by distance, as predicted by the standard 
urban economic model. Regarding ethnic segregation, the distance channel dominates the 
income one, but this is likely to be due to a non-market effect, i.e. the location of the public 
housing supply in close inner-suburbs. More important, both of them are dominated by the 
inertia of the previously prevailing segregated pattern.  
 
Our analysis thus confirms the importance the choices of distance to the central city and 
neighborhood income in the formation of residential segregation. It also shed light on a third 
“segregation channel” that may be worth further investigation: the tendency to relocate nearby 
one’s former location, which is presumably linked with the question of moving costs and 
access to social networks. 
 
Several limits should now be overrun. First, our analyses are mainly based on mean 
tendencies among the 37 urban areas considered. We should try to explain the heterogeneity 
displayed in our results. Second, our econometric model assumes the Independence of 
Irrelevant Alternatives hypothesis (IAA). We should test for it and if necessary turn to another 
model.  
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Appendix 1 
 
The French Population Census does not contain information regarding the household's 
income. However, it contains detailed information concerning the households' members, that 
allows to predict its income. Coefficients used in this prediction are based on a regression 
performed on a sample taken from the French Housing Survey (hereafter FHS) 1996. 
 
On this secondary sample, the natural logarithm of the household's income is regressed on the 
main determinants of wages and income subsidies available in the FHS. The following 
variables are included in the estimation: 
- Age (and squared age): age of the “reference person of the household”  
- Gender: “reference person of the household” is a woman, 
- Marr: “reference person of the household” is married, 
- Divo: “reference person of the household” is divorced, 
- Wido: “reference person of the household” is widowed, 
- Foreign: “reference person of the household” is not a French citizen, 
- Educ_1-6: level of education of the “reference person of the household” from 1 to 6, 
- Status_1-8: socio-occupational status of the “reference person of the household” from 1 to 6, 
- Nbwork: number of persons having a job in the household, 
- Nbchild: number of children living in the household. 
 
The R² of the estimation is equal to 0.62. All the estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 5% level and the Ficher test indicates significance of the overall estimation. 
Detailed results of this estimation are available on request.  
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Table 4: Estimated coefficients of the conditional logit model for the five largest urban areas.  
 
 Paris Lyon Aix-Marseille Lille Toulouse 
 coeff. std coeff. std coeff. std coeff. std coeff. std 
Interactions with location av. income           
av. income x executive 1.25*** 0.05 1.37*** 0.19 1.81*** 0.39 1.3*** 0.21 1.34*** 0.38 
av. income x white-collar -0.88*** 0.05 -0.54*** 0.18 -0.82** 0.37 -0.89*** 0.21 -1.05** 0.43 
av. income x blue collar -1.36*** 0.06 -0.85*** 0.16 -1.87*** 0.35 -1.8*** 0.19 -1.24*** 0.39 
av. income x indep. work. 0.66*** 0.08 0.75*** 0.24 0.37 0.47 0.67** 0.30 0.27 0.49 
av. income x out of lab. force -0.2*** 0.06 -0.27 0.18 -0.01 0.35 -0.73*** 0.21 -0.81* 0.43 
av. income x F. born abroad -0.61*** 0.06 -0.63*** 0.20 -0.68** 0.32 -0.81** 0.34 0.3 0.38 
av. income x foreigner -1.21*** 0.06 -1.82*** 0.22 -1.73*** 0.59 -2.22*** 0.36 -1.02 0.80 
av. income x hsld size -0.06*** 0.01 0.27*** 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.2*** 0.05 0.37*** 0.10 
Interactions with location av. distance           
distance x executive -1.01*** 0.11 -0.87 0.58 1.25* 0.70 -0.52 1.05 -0.48 0.89 
dist.**2 x executive 2.48*** 0.41 7.93* 4.30 7.43** 3.37 17.75 11.88 9.06 6.37 
distance x white-collar -0.76*** 0.11 -1.46*** 0.54 -1.59** 0.66 -1.26 1.01 -1.71** 0.81 
dist.**2 x white-collar -0.3 0.43 5.97 4.02 -3.16 3.03 6.41 11.11 -0.53 5.96 
distance x blue collar 0.86*** 0.10 0.99** 0.43 -0.05 0.58 -1.92** 0.93 0.17 0.71 
dist.**2 x blue collar 0.29 0.41 -4.71 3.51 -5.49** 2.73 -34.53*** 10.35 -4.39 5.25 
distance x indep. work. 0.62*** 0.14 1.1 0.68 0.81 0.81 2.73* 1.42 2.54*** 0.93 
dist.**2 x indep. work. 4.06*** 0.58 -0.01 5.24 1.53 3.87 2.88 16.05 5.5 6.91 
distance x out of lab. force 0.48*** 0.11 -0.69 0.53 0.22 0.59 0.76 1.02 0.68 0.77 
dist.**2 x out of lab. force 4.05*** 0.43 -0.96 4.01 1.85 2.83 10.93 10.99 8.95 5.91 
distance x F. born abroad -2.52*** 0.14 -1.76*** 0.57 -0.21 0.52 -3.22 2.61 -0.77 0.75 
dist.**2 x F. born abroad -1.5*** 0.50 -2.31 4.29 -0.63 2.43 -8.89 25.72 -2 5.57 
distance x foreigner -3.59*** 0.14 -4.62*** 0.65 -1.78* 1.01 -5.84** 2.89 -5.77*** 1.55 
dist.**2 x foreigner -0.95* 0.51 0.17 4.77 3.42 5.14 -5.43 27.79 1.68 11.20 
distance x hsld size 0.58*** 0.02 0.91*** 0.11 0.07 0.14 1.85*** 0.23 1.41*** 0.18 
distance**2 x hsld size -2.69*** 0.09 -11.4*** 0.90 -2.91*** 0.68 -7.1*** 2.51 -9.74*** 1.36 
           
Previous residence in same location 2.15*** 0.01 2.11*** 0.02 2.86*** 0.02 2.32*** 0.02 2.11*** 0.03 
Averaged fixed effects 
(all fixed effects are signif. at 1% level) 
          
Close inner suburbs -0.8  -1.73  -1.91  -0.84  -2.15  
Distant inner suburbs -2.03  -3.03  -1.93  -1.42  -3.01  
Close outer suburbs -2.64  -3.23  -2.58  -2.64  -3.21  
Distant outer suburbs -3.19  -3.1  -2.72  -3.08  -3.49  
           
Log likelihood -163,352  -20,636  -12,608  -13,335  -10,731  
Number of observations 89,823  11,895  10,799  7,846  6,242  
***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 5: Joint significativity tests of estimated coefficients of the conditional logit – 37 urban areas.  
 
 Paris Lyon Aix-
Marseille 
Lille Toulouse Nice Bordeaux Nantes Strasbourg Toulon Douai-
Lens 
Rennes Rouen 
Likelihood -16,352 -20,636 -12,608 -13,335 -10,731 -9,161 -11,074 -7,905 -6,264 -5,622 -4,650 -5,478 -7,348 
Interactions w/ occupation 4282.3*** 293.8*** 142.0*** 268.8*** 146.5*** 72.3*** 216.6*** 117.8*** 93.6*** 30.85** 45.06*** 131.56*** 168.8*** 
av. income x occ. 2695*** 167.52*** 103.5*** 239.7*** 529*** 38.08*** 89.57*** 18.64*** 23.94*** 3.48 39.86*** 6.31 106.6*** 
distance x occ. 890.6*** 103.9*** 50.9*** 39.5*** 56.4*** 22.57** 81.35*** 68.46*** 58.03*** 12.67 11.49 80.07*** 64.43*** 
Interactions w/ origin 1856.3*** 146.7*** 54.6*** 73.0*** 51.0*** 22.93*** 40.05*** 29.6*** 133.09*** 14.14** 5.43 49.16*** 48.99*** 
av. income x origin 483.6*** 68.29*** 13.31*** 45.0*** -0.56 1.1 4.36 -0.3 -0.19 -0.57 2.76 -1.62 10.99*** 
distance x origin 1640.9*** 104.35*** 26.95*** 29.8*** 47.3*** 21.03*** 37.41*** 29.46*** 126.03*** 8.66 2.79 45.3*** 35.31*** 
Fixed effects 92511*** 10304*** 13052*** 8688*** 4580*** 8263 4357*** 3642*** 3318*** 5073*** 4064*** 2335*** 3342*** 
Whole model 182271*** 26131*** 35975*** 17789*** 13909*** 21059*** 12123*** 10489*** 9436*** 10248*** 7886*** 7578*** 6452*** 
 
 
 Grenoble Mont-
pellier 
Metz Nancy Clermont-
Ferrand 
Valencien
nes 
Tours Caen Orléans Angers  Dijon Saint-
Étienne 
Le Havre 
Likelihood -6,090 -3990 -4721 -4813 -5023 -3914 -4044 -4530 -3845 -3343 -3440 -2542 -2309 
Interactions w/ occupation 139.42*** 102.69*** 92.03*** 90.83*** 87.11*** 63.85*** 65.3*** 82.79*** 99.19*** 39.23*** 86.63*** 23.44* 90.65*** 
av. income x occ. 108.94*** 41.56*** 52.4*** 49.6*** 37.1*** 41.8*** 18.8*** 40.5*** 48.6*** 20.9*** 47.1*** 8.5 53.2*** 
distance x occ. 40.95*** 47.85*** 19.01** 32.88*** 54.85*** 1.63 38.81*** 40.65*** 52.31*** 14.82 43.62*** 12.81 15.61 
Interactions w/ origin 28.85*** 61.44*** 44.74*** 47.2*** 27.06*** -0.13 12.43* 8.53** 16.49** 27.45*** 32.05*** 26.54*** 15.54** 
av. income x origin 5.73 3.18 40.99*** 25.88*** 2.1 -3.89 -3.5 2.32 -1.83 5.23* 11.37*** 9.36** -3.73 
distance x origin 19.45*** 46.3*** 20.79*** 38.41*** 24.07*** -0.41 10.78** 2.74* 15.6*** 21.73*** 19.79*** 15.79*** 15.08*** 
Fixed effects 3008*** 1812*** 2760*** 2049*** 2074*** 2823*** 1516*** 1584*** 1388*** 1194*** 1190*** 2196*** 945*** 
Whole model 7408*** 7586*** 5461*** 5185*** 5458***  4735*** 4792*** 4534*** 3982***  4918*** 5184*** 7927*** 7894*** 
 
 
 Le Mans Avignon Mulhouse Amiens Béthune Dunkerque Perpignan Besançon Pau Bayonne Genève(CH)-
Annemasse 
Likelihood -2799 -2687 -2770 -2295 -2140 -3027 -2377 -1901 -2086 -2245 -2462 
Interactions w/ occupation 57.24*** 36.72*** 43.47*** 57.24*** 28.65** 52.8*** 19.28 58.74*** 28.47** 20.5 29.9** 
av. income x occ. 14.62** 18.09*** 18.06*** 8.98 23.09*** 38.61*** 0.24 12.3** 0.61 7.15 6.54 
distance x occ. 26.32*** 18.34** 20.44** 23.24** 5.96 10.35 15.65 35.01** 22.58** 9.69 21.66** 
Interactions w/ origin 18.29** 20.3*** 23.31*** 10.38 0.67 8.07 14.25** 25.77** 7.44 9.07 4.08 
av. income x origin 2.45 14.09*** 7.75** -3.2 -3.03 -4.16 -0.41 -0.35 0.07 1.42 0.53 
distance x origin 15.17*** 5.15 7.62 9.86** -2.45 7.21 12.54** 25.49*** 5.93 0.71 3.33 
Fixed effects 1127*** 2335*** 1115*** 769*** 1690*** 1971*** 1674*** 614*** 561*** 1211*** 1727*** 
Whole model 5180 4388*** 4586***  4340*** 3840*** 3585*** 4289*** 4006*** 2645*** 2820*** 2210*** 
 
***, **, *: significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
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Table 6: Signs of significant  coefficients – 37 urban areas 
 
 
 Paris Lyon 
Aix-
Mar-
seille 
Lille Tou-louse Nice 
Bor-
deaux Nantes 
Stras-
bourg Toulon 
Douai-
Lens 
Ren-
nes Rouen 
Greno-
ble 
Mont-
pellier Metz Nancy 
Cler-
mont-
Ferrand 
Valen-
ciennes 
inc x ex + + + + + +   +    + + + + + + + 
inc x bl - - - - -  - - -  - - - -  - - - - 
inc x wh - - - - - - - -   - - -   - -  - 
inc x ind + +  +  + -        +     
inc x ina - -  - -  -    -     -   - 
inc ffor - - - -             -   
inc x for - - - -   -     - - - - - - -  
inc x siz - +  + + +  + + -  + + + + + +   
dis x ex -  +     -            
dis2 x ex + + +          + +      
dis x bl + +  -   +             
dis2 x bl   - -          -    -  
dis x wh - - -  -  - - -   - - -   - -  
dis2 x wh                    
dis x ind +   + + + + +    + +  + + + +  
dis2 x ind +     +              
dis x ina +        -   +        
dis2 x ina +       + +  +         
dis ffor - -    - - - -    - -   -   
dis2 x ffor -     -              
dis x for - - - - -  - - -   - - - - - - -  
dis2 x for -     +              
dis x siz + +  + +  + + +   + + + + + + +  
dis2 x siz - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
prev res. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + 
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Table 6: Signs of significant  coefficients – 37 urban areas (continued) 
 
 Tours Caen Or-léans 
An-
gers 
 
Dijon 
Saint-
Étien-
ne 
Le 
Havre 
Le 
Mans 
Avi-
gnon 
Mul-
house 
A-
miens 
Béthu
ne 
Dunker-
que 
Perpi-
gnan 
Besan-
çon Pau 
Bayon
-ne 
Genève-
Anne-
masse 
Total + Total  - 
inc x ex + + +  +    +   +      + 21  
inc x bl - - - - - - - -   -  -  -     27 
inc x wh  - -  -  -   - -  -  -     22 
inc x ind        - +          6 2 
inc x ina -    -  -     - -  -     14 
inc ffor        - -           7 
inc x for  -  - - -   - -          18 
inc x siz  +                 13 2 
dis x ex  -                 1 3 
dis2 x ex   +  +              7  
dis x bl                   3 1 
dis2 x bl                  + 1 4 
dis x wh  - -  -  - -  - -    -     20 
dis2 x wh                +   1  
dis x ind + + +  +        -  +   + 18 1 
dis2 x ind          +         3  
dis x ina  -        -         2 3 
dis2 x ina  +       +         + 7  
dis ffor  -  - -      -         13 
dis2 x ffor                    2 
dis x for   - - -   -  -     -     21 
dis2 x for                   1 1 
dis x siz + + + + +  + +  + +  +  +    25  
dis2 x siz - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - -  35 
prev res. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +  37 
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Table 7: Income segregation indexes of the five largest urban areas 
 
 Paris Lyon Marseille Lille Toulouse 
Four groups      
Observed 0.18630 0.15553 0.09821 0.17279 0.10778 
Whole model 0.17881 0.13167 0.10218 0.14914 0.08644 
Distance only 0.06219 0.05096 0.07443 0.03592 0.05497 
Income only 0.12292 0.06211 0.08159 0.11830 0.07325 
Previous location only 0.07201 0.05820 0.04165 0.06860 0.02701 
Five groups      
Observed 0.17710 0.15139 0.09398 0.17009 0.11091 
Whole model 0.17037 0.12527 0.09241 0.14871 0.09324 
Distance only 0.05900 0.04692 0.06682 0.03833 0.05626 
Income only 0.11619 0.06122 0.07373 0.11701 0.06615 
Previous location only 0.06917 0.05389 0.03811 0.06742 0.02907 
In/out labor force      
Observed 0.07774 0.09185 0.08969 0.11147 0.14391 
Whole model 0.06795 0.06839 0.06110 0.07603 0.10411 
Distance only 0.07007 0.07075 0.02411 0.06723 0.08083 
Income only 0.01251 0.01783 0.01574 0.03995 0.05487 
Previous location only 0.02417 0.01723 0.04789 0.03922 0.02023 
Executives/blue-collars      
Observed 0.42443 0.33294 0.16615 0.36385 0.20225 
Whole model 0.41523 0.29237 0.16213 0.31904 0.13947 
Distance only 0.12259 0.03914 0.11887 0.04776 0.01776 
Income only 0.27565 0.15010 0.22771 0.28244 0.16632 
Previous location only 0.16370 0.15299 0.07087 0.15337 0.07380 
Executives/intermediate category      
Observed 0.23412 0.16674 0.09519 0.15833 0.10911 
Whole model 0.22340 0.15274 0.09324 0.12183 0.08536 
Distance only 0.07078 0.01664 0.04918 0.02116 0.02867 
Income only 0.11697 0.09960 0.12012 0.12902 0.10267 
Previous location only 0.10884 0.08466 0.03944 0.06338 0.03551 
Executives/white-collars      
Observed 0.29837 0.18975 0.15868 0.23487 0.13885 
Whole model 0.28396 0.17606 0.17019 0.23017 0.15475 
Distance only 0.01632 0.09703 0.10607 0.03949 0.13310 
Income only 0.20839 0.13725 0.16935 0.21222 0.16984 
Previous location only 0.12416 0.10002 0.06575 0.10208 0.04252 
Intermediate category/blue-collars      
Observed 0.20267 0.17502 0.10495 0.22826 0.11524 
Whole model 0.19793 0.14805 0.10243 0.20746 0.08562 
Distance only 0.05182 0.04387 0.06969 0.05231 0.01302 
Income only 0.15989 0.06402 0.10830 0.15450 0.06425 
Previous location only 0.06185 0.07166 0.03879 0.09590 0.03866 
Intermediate category/white-collars      
Observed 0.10477 0.12263 0.08894 0.13906 0.10348 
Whole model 0.09431 0.09954 0.09747 0.10961 0.09286 
Distance only 0.06667 0.09051 0.09256 0.01833 0.10444 
Income only 0.09157 0.04537 0.04928 0.08423 0.06777 
Previous location only 0.02615 0.02437 0.04167 0.04341 0.00838 
White-collars/blue-collars      
Observed 0.14617 0.18004 0.13582 0.15549 0.17186 
Whole model 0.14694 0.14603 0.13326 0.13000 0.13040 
Distance only 0.11849 0.13439 0.15092 0.05981 0.11535 
Income only 0.06895 0.01865 0.05902 0.07052 0.00352 
Previous location only 0.04087 0.05303 0.05351 0.06680 0.03264 
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Table 8: Ethnic segregation indexes of the five largest urban areas 
 
 Paris Lyon Marseille Lille Toulouse 
Multigroup ethnic segregation      
Observed 0.14330 0.14217 0.09389 0.22632 0.08820 
Whole model 0.14036 0.12330 0.08008 0.18648 0.06527 
Distance only 0.09096 0.06378 0.02013 0.04057 0.04602 
Income only 0.11391 0.07457 0.05522 0.12344 0.00331 
Previous location only 0.06518 0.06544 0.06145 0.10850 0.06183 
Foreign citizen/French citizen      
Observed 0.17102 0.18351 0.17504 0.30040 0.22004 
Whole model 0.16759 0.17023 0.14130 0.25067 0.19473 
Distance only 0.09567 0.09149 0.05894 0.07068 0.15070 
Income only 0.16486 0.12213 0.10550 0.18528 0.01096 
Previous location only 0.07452 0.07462 0.07982 0.13696 0.11018 
French born abroad/French born in France      
Observed 0.11836 0.11046 0.06582 0.14055 0.05172 
Whole model 0.11493 0.08409 0.05941 0.10917 0.01840 
Distance only 0.08738 0.04045 0.01452 0.02671 0.02933 
Income only 0.06182 0.03424 0.03817 0.04979 0.00203 
Previous location only 0.05628 0.05853 0.05723 0.07449 0.04484 
Foreigners/French born abroad      
Observed 0.11055 0.11562 0.12364 0.17990 0.20150 
Whole model 0.10010 0.09682 0.09285 0.16276 0.17873 
Distance only 0.01828 0.05633 0.06823 0.09603 0.17637 
Income only 0.11084 0.09140 0.07404 0.13839 0.01273 
Previous location only 0.02789 0.02563 0.03889 0.06973 0.07151 
Foreigners/French born in France      
Observed 0.18387 0.19271 0.18646 0.30700 0.22270 
Whole model 0.18027 0.17861 0.15162 0.25624 0.19701 
Distance only 0.10567 0.09564 0.05696 0.06932 0.14704 
Income only 0.17184 0.12564 0.11221 0.18781 0.01071 
Previous location only 0.08096 0.08052 0.08858 0.14077 0.11577 
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Table 9: Observed dissimilarity indexes – averages for 37 urban areas 
 
 Mean Std Dev Min. Max. 
Social segregation     
Multi-group indexes      
Four groups1 0.1414 0.0277 0.0725 0.1906 
Five groups2 0.1426 0.0262 0.0801 0.1873 
Six groups3 0.1552 0.0290 0.0852 0.2284 
Two-groups indexes     
Executives/blue collars 0.2547 0.0807 0.1269 0.4244 
Executives/intermediate categ. 0.1503 0.0502 0.0673 0.3008 
Executives/white-collars 0.1893 0.0509 0.1050 0.2984 
Intermediate/blue collars 0.1548 0.0443 0.0605 0.2292 
Intermediate/white collars 0.1407 0.0335 0.0783 0.2360 
White collars/blue collars 0.1764 0.0486 0.0654 0.2956 
In labor force/out LF 0.1254 0.0359 0.0687 0.1969 
Ethnic segregation     
Multi-group index     
Three origin groups 0.1766 0.0559 0.0882 0.3172 
Binary indexes*     
French born abroad/born in Fr. 0.1560 0.0597 0.0517 0.2688 
Foreign/French born abroad 0.1868 0.0565 0.0799 0.2763 
Foreign/French born in France 0.2410 0.0641 0.1138 0.4098 
1 The four groups are the following: executives, intermediate category, white-collars, blue-collars.  
2 The five groups are the previous ones, plus the independent workers. 
3 The six groups are the previous ones, plus the out-of-labor force category. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Ratio of predicted over observed dissimilarity indexes – averages for 37 urban areas 
 
 Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Social segregation     
Multi-group indexes      
Four groups1 0.7160 0.1674 0.3097 1.0405 
Five groups2 0.7209 0.1499 0.3310 0.9834 
Six groups3 0.7952 0.1336 0.3337 0.9855 
Two-group indexes     
Executives/blue collars 0.7016 0.1993 0.2465 0.9783 
Executives/intermediate categ. 0.6441 0.2575 0.1344 1.0736 
Executives/white-collars 0.7636 0.2369 0.2152 1.1145 
Intermediate/blue collars 0.6881 0.2720 0.1932 1.2046 
Intermediate/white collars 0.7011 0.2062 0.2677 0.9766 
White collars/blue collars 0.7094 0.2595 0.3056 1.6982 
In labor force/out LF 0.7062 0.2260 0.1400 1.0717 
Ethnic segregation     
Multi-group index     
Three origin groups 0.6356 0.2078 0.1845 0.9890 
Two-group indexes*     
French born abroad/born in Fr. 0.5413 0.2341 0.2089 0.9710 
Foreign/French born abroad 0.7284 0.2581 0.2839 1.3347 
Foreign/French born in France 0.6788 0.2372 0.2033 1.0574 
1 The four groups are the following: executives, intermediate category, white-collars, blue-collars.  
2 The five groups are the previous ones, plus the independent workers. 
3 The six groups are the previous ones, plus the out-of-labor force category. 
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Table 11: Proportion of observed social segregation predicted by the partial models 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Four groups1     
Occupational status only 0.7268 0.1701 0.3097 1.0382 
Origin only 0.3189 0.0994 0.1347 0.5977 
Distance only 0.3639 0.2197 0.0682 0.9132 
Income only 0.4150 0.2595 2.14 E-15 0.9045 
Previous location only 0.3229 0.0951 0.1347 0.5941 
Five groups2     
Occupational status only 0.7323 0.1545 0.3310 0.9824 
Origin only 0.3185 0.0994 0.1448 0.5722 
Distance only 0.3663 0.2048 0.0631 0.7884 
Income only 0.3966 0.2476 2.35 E-15 0.8945 
Previous location only 0.3227 0.0947 0.1574 0.5698 
Six groups3     
Occupational status only 0.8010 0.1357 0.3337 0.9924 
Origin only 0.5180 0.1202 0.2755 0.7716 
Distance only 0.5813 0.1604 0.1177 0.9085 
Income only 0.5620 0.1996 0.0133 0.8884 
Previous location only 0.5202 0.1187 0.2921 0.7716 
Executives/blue collars     
Occupational status only 0.7092 0.2004 0.2502 0.9844 
Origin only 0.3934 0.1129 0.1425 0.7069 
Distance only 0.1590 0.1797 0.0027 0.7154 
Income only 0.5068 0.3587 3.43 E-15 1.3705 
Previous location only 0.3989 0.1104 0.1656 0.7027 
Executives/white-collars     
Occupation status only 0.7672 0.2342 0.2373 1.1121 
Origin only 0.3686 0.1448 0.1227 0.6460 
Distance only 0.4951 0.4573 0.0157 1.8095 
Income only 0.5879 0.4026 2.64E-15 1.2837 
Previous location only 0.3678 0.1456 0.1226 0.6484 
Executives/intermediate categ.     
Occupational status only 0.6447 0.2587 0.1322 1.0829 
Origin only 0.4119 0.1671 0.1617 0.8566 
Distance only 0.2124 0.2285 0.0007 1.1112 
Income only 0.4580 0.4600 3.30 E-15 1.5689 
Previous location only 0.4106 0.1669 0.1676 0.8566 
Intermediate categ./white-collars     
Occupational status only 0.6856 0.2709 0.1932 1.2117 
Origin only 0.2408 0.1170 0.0692 0.4808 
Distance only 0.5410 0.3971 0.0104 1.1425 
Income only 0.3515 0.3431 9.44 E-16 1.4135 
Previous location only 0.2388 0.1161 0.0692 0.4684 
Blue-collars/white-collars     
Occupational status only 0.7349 0.2732 0.3056 1.7863 
Origin only 0.2628 0.1353 0.0679 0.6472 
Distance only 0.5501 0.3377 0.1117 1.6159 
Income only 0.2276 0.2222 1.85E-15 0.7979 
Previous location only 0.2711 0.1328 0.0679 0.6547 
Intermediate categ./blue-collars     
Occupational status only 0.7197 0.2082 0.2677 0.9850 
Origin only 0.3398 0.1069 0.1444 0.5716 
Distance only 0.1889 0.1693 0.0140 0.7902 
Income only 0.4207 0.3351 2.37E-15 1.4252 
Previous location only 0.3481 0.1046 0.1455 0.6554 
In labor force/out of labor force     
Occupational status only 0.7010 0.2280 0.1471 1.0717 
Origin only 0.2580 0.1235 0.0775 0.5751 
Distance only 0.5686 0.2950 0.0517 1.2200 
Income only 0.2925 0.2871 9.42E-16 1.1941 
Previous location only 0.2532 0.1216 0.0700 0.5751 
1 The four groups are the following: executives, intermediate category, white-collars, blue-collars.  
2 The five groups are the previous ones, plus the independent workers. 
3 The six groups are the previous ones, plus the out-of-labor force category. 
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Table 12: Proportion of observed ethnic segregation predicted by the partial models 
 
 Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Foreigners/French born 
abroad/French born in France 
    
Occupation status only 0.3767 0.1142 0.1490 0.6164 
Origin only 0.6419 0.1981 0.2278 1.0276 
Distance only 0.3481 0.2205 0.0355 0.8289 
Income only 0.2409 0.2689 3.80 E-14 0.8628 
Previous location only 0.4313 0.1153 0.1733 0.7010 
French born abroad/French born in 
France 
    
Occupation status only 0.3824 0.1449 0.1583 0.7341 
Origin only 0.5669 0.2258 0.1947 1.0580 
Distance only 0.2915 0.2536 0.0095 0.8417 
Income only 0.1148 0.1744 3.86E-14 0.5965 
Previous location only 0.4379 0.1585 0.1877 0.8694 
Foreign/French born abroad     
Occupation status only 0.4766 0.3125 0.0850 2.0262 
Origin only 0.5854 0.1944 0.2551 1.0211 
Distance only 0.5213 0.5573 0.0251 2.0379 
Income only 0.3716 0.3925 0 1.3362 
Previous location only 0.3853 0.1697 0.0894 0.8063 
Foreign/French born in France     
Occupation status only 0.3779 0.1260 0.1255 0.6753 
Origin only 0.6636 0.2064 0.2996 1.0021 
Distance only 0.3899 0.2595 0.0319 0.9831 
Income only 0.3157 0.3366 3.38E-14 1.1697 
Previous location only 0.4098 0.1132 0.1641 0.6426 
 
 
 
